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a b s t r a c t
This paper analyzes anonymous job applications of Ph.D. economists in the academic job market. We use
data on interview invitations from a randomized experiment at a European-based research institution.
Results show that the underrepresented gender was hurt by anonymous applications.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V.Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Firms should hire the most productive workers—discrimina-
tion is costly. However, empirical studies document substantial
discrimination in hiring (e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004;
Carlsson and Rooth, 2007). This market failure calls for policy
interventions, amongwhich anonymous job applications gain pop-
ularity. Their intuition is straightforward: Removing information
about characteristics employers may discriminate against should
reduce or even eliminate discrimination. Several European coun-
tries have recently conducted experiments with this approach.
Available results are encouraging and indicate that positive effects
for minority groups can materialize (e.g., Åslund and Nordström
Skans, 2012; Krause et al., 2012).
This paper analyzes the effects of anonymous job applications
in a particular labor market. We use data on interview invitations
from a randomized experiment. Participants are economists
applying at a European-based economic research institution for a
post-doctoral position. Because of random assignment, we can rule
out any selection into treatment status. Our paper therefore adds to
the literature on anonymous job applications and to the literature
on the annual job market.
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53072 Bonn, Germany. Tel.: +49 0 228 3894 528; fax: +49 0 228 3894 510.
E-mail address: rinne@iza.org (U. Rinne).
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.2. The job market for Ph.D. economists
The annual job market for Ph.D. economists is exceptionally
organized. Mainly academic institutions, but also government
agencies andprivate firms stand on the demand side. The screening
process is an annual three-step procedure.
The first step is in early fall when vacancies are posted.
Candidates send their applications to potential employers, who
then decide about interview invitations. The second stage takes
place at the Allied Social Science Association (ASSA) meetings in
January, where candidates and employers meet for interviews. In
a third step, the most convincing candidates visit the institutions
between January and March. Job offers are also communicated
during this period. Candidates and institutions from outside the
United States also participate in this market.
The literature on the annual job market is mainly concerned
with determinants of the screening process. Professional signals
are identified as most important determinants of interview
and hiring decisions. For example, the number of publications
positively affects the number of interviews and site visits (Taube,
1987; Carson and Navarro, 1988; List, 2000). Ph.D. economists
from higher-ranked departments tend to have more interviews
and job offers (Stock et al., 2000). Reference letters from eminent
economists increase the number of interview invitations (List,
2000, 2001). On the demand side, the higher employers are ranked,
the more likely are applicants to accept their job offer (Barbezat,
1992; Stock et al., 2000).
442 A. Krause et al. / Economics Letters 117 (2012) 441–444Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Source: Own experimental data.
Standard Anonymous t-statistics
Interview invitation 0.244 0.171 0.811
(0.435) (0.381)
Female 0.341 0.366 −0.228
(0.480) (0.488)
Non-Western origin 0.293 0.268 0.234
(0.461) (0.449)
Age 30.78 29.95 1.269
(3.158) (2.747)
Number of papers 4.366 4.610 −0.354
(3.352) (2.862)
Number of publications in A/A+ journals 0.073 0.195 −1.266
(0.461) (0.511)
Ph.D. from top 20 university 0.171 0.293 −1.306
(0.381) (0.461)
Years to complete Ph.D. 5.000 4.707 1.080
(1.285) (1.167)
Ph.D. at time of application 0.146 0.171 −0.299
(0.358) (0.381)
Work experience 0.122 0.049 1.181
(0.331) (0.218)
Experience in institution’s fields of specialization 0.756 0.634 1.195
(0.068) (0.076)
Number of observations 41 41
Notes: standard deviations in parentheses. Non-Western origin is defined as having citizenship from an African, Asian,
Latin American or Eastern European country. A/A+ journals are defined according to the Handelsblatt journal ranking.
Top universities are defined according to the RePEc ranking (July 2011). * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.However, some studies suggest that gender, age and ethnic
background influence the invitation probability (e.g. List, 2001).
This gives rise to the question whether such different treatments
are present when anonymous job applications are introduced.
3. Experiment and sample
Our experiment took place at a European-based economic
research institution during the annual job market 2010/2011. In
total, 148 applications were screened and 26 candidates were
invited for interviews at the ASSA meetings.
Because of data protection laws, our sample decreases to 96
individuals. Participants in the experiment have to give permission
to use their data, and we electronically asked them to do so.
The response rate of about 65% appears reasonable, in particular
when considering the time lag of about four months between
application submission and request for permission. We are not
aware of any reason why this procedure results in a selective
sample. For example, our outcome of interest appears not related
to individual responses. Out of 26 candidates who received an
interview invitation, 6 applicants did not give permission. Data
protection laws prevent us to analyze the issue of selective
response inmore detail. Our final sample consists of 82 individuals
whenwe exclude observationswithmissing information about age
and citizenship.
Applicants were not aware of the experiment. Applications
were submitted as usual and no specific requirements were
imposed. After the application deadline had expired, treatment
status was randomly assigned. If included in the treatment group,
name, contact details, age, nationality, gender and any other
indications of the candidate’s identity were overwritten with
correction fluid.
Otherwise, the screening process for interview invitations was
conducted as in previous years by twomembers of the institution’s
experienced hiring committee. Both are male, of European origin
and senior researchers involved for years in hiring decisions.They reviewed both standard and anonymous applications. While
they were aware of the experiment, they were involved neither
in its design nor in the analysis of the data. The preparation
of the material and an imposed strong time-pressure to review
the applications have left only a few possibilities to identify
the applicants. Both reviewers are experienced researchers
and interviewers, open to experiments and monitoring. Also
in previous traditional recruitments, invitation decisions were
typically reviewed by a different member of the hiring committee.
Hence, the reviewers were unlikely to react to the experimental
situation. According to the recruiters, a maximum of four to six
positions could be filled.
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the two groups with
anonymous and standard applications. The randomization appears
successful as anydifferences are insignificant. About 20% receive an
interview invitation. About one third are female, the average age is
around30 years, and roughly 30%have a non-Western background.
Applicants have written between four and five papers, of which
less than one is published inA/A+ journals. About 25% receive their
Ph.D. degree from top 20 departments. Applicants need about five
years to complete their Ph.D. and less than 20% already hold a Ph.D.
degree when they apply. Few applicants have work experience
outside academia. About 70% have experience in the institution’s
fields of specialization.1
The distribution of characteristics is similar to related studies.
The slightly larger fraction of women in our sample is likely related
to the increasing number of female economists over time (most
other studies use data from more than ten years ago). The fraction
of applicants from top 20 departmentsmay appear relatively small.
But given that most of these departments are based in the United
States, and that most applicants receiving their Ph.D. in the United
States apply in this region, applicants from these departments
should appear more often in North American data.
1 Results are similar when excluding 25 applicants without experience in these
fields.
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Probit regressions.
Source: Own experimental data.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Anonymous −0.073 −0.056 −0.029 0.124
(0.089) (0.089) (0.086) (0.104)
Female 0.117 0.129 0.297***
(0.086) (0.082) (0.107)
Anonymous× Female −0.383***
(0.136)
Non-Western origin −0.020 −0.030 −0.007
(0.090) (0.089) (0.123)
Anonymous× Non-Western origin 0.038
(0.176)
Age 1.067** 1.158** 1.131**
(0.477) (0.523) (0.480)
Age squared −0.017** −0.019** −0.018**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Number of publications in A/A+ journals 0.052 0.032
(0.081) (0.085)
Ph.D. from top 20 university −0.092 −0.128
(0.098) (0.094)
Years to complete Ph.D. −0.065* −0.058*
(0.034) (0.032)
Ph.D. at time of application −0.206 −0.248*
(0.149) (0.149)
Work experience 0.284** 0.250**
(0.133) (0.124)
Log likelihood −41.516 −37.532 −34.619 −32.166
Number of observations 82 82 82 82
Notes: average marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable equals 1 if
individual is invited.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.4. Results
Table 2 displays the results of probit regressions. The dependent
variable equals 1 if an interview invitation is received and 0
otherwise. Column (1) displays the raw difference in this outcome
between standard and anonymous applications. This difference
is not statistically different from zero and remains so when
we include additional control variables. Hence, anonymous job
applications do not have an impact on the invitation probability.
We include socio-demographic and professional characteristics
in columns (2) and (3). Age has an inversely U-shaped effect
on the invitation probability. Being female and having a non-
Western background do not significantly influence the recruiters’
decision. The number of publications in A/A+ journals is positively
associated with the invitation probability, although this effect is
not statistically significant. Candidates who already hold a Ph.D.
degree have a lower invitation probability. Already holding a
degree may be interpreted as a negative signal because it likely
indicates that the candidate does not participate in the market for
the first time (Cawley, 2011). Work experience outside academia
has a significantly positive effect on the outcome variable. This can
be explained by the fact that the institution also serves as a place of
communication between economic research and political practice.
To identify whether anonymous job applications have differ-
ent effects on certain groups, we add interaction terms between
treatment status and socio-demographic characteristics in col-
umn (4). Whereas the coefficient estimate on the interaction term
between anonymous applications and female is significantly neg-
ative, the coefficient estimate for female becomes significantly
positive. This indicates that (a) with standard applications, fe-
male applicants are more likely to receive an interview invitationrelative tomale applicants, and that (b) this relative advantage dis-
appears with anonymous job applications. One possible explana-
tion is that female candidates are generally favored in the hiring
process at this institution, but such behavior is not possible when
gender is unknown.
Professional signals might receive a different weight when
screening anonymous applications. This hypothesis is confirmed
when we include interaction terms between professional charac-
teristics and treatment status.2 For example, whereas publications
in A/A+ journals have a significantly negative effect on the invita-
tion probability with standard applications, this effect disappears
with anonymous job applications. It thus seems that the recruiters
interpret ‘‘traditional’’ quality signals differently when confronted
with anonymous job applications.
5. Conclusions
To analyze the effects of anonymous job applications in the an-
nual job market for Ph.D. economists, we use data from a random-
ized experiment among applicants at a European-based economic
research institution. Our results indicate that anonymous job ap-
plications are in general not associated with a different invitation
probability.
However, whereas female applicants have a higher probability
to receive an invitation than male applicants with standard appli-
cations, this difference disappears with anonymous applications.
Whereas this indicates thatmales were discriminated against with
standard application procedures, this is not the case for applicants
2 Results confirming this hypothesis are displayed and discussed in an earlier
version; see Krause et al. (2011).
444 A. Krause et al. / Economics Letters 117 (2012) 441–444of non-Western origin. The results moreover indicate that certain
professional signals are weighted differently with anonymous ap-
plications. Our results concur with the often discussed notion that
anonymity prevents employers from favoring minority applicants
when credentials are equal—at least in the initial stage of the hir-
ing process (see, e.g., Åslund and Nordström Skans, 2012, p. 100)
(Krause et al., 2012, p. 48). Anonymous job applications thus do
not have very large effects in our study. However, one should be
cautious when generalizing from this finding. We also need to rec-
ognize that the instrument of anonymous job applications only has
potential if there is a relevant size of discrimination. Discrimina-
tion is lower for high-skilled occupations and in more competitive
labor markets. This may limit the effects of anonymous job appli-
cations in the case studied here. The effects may, however, be very
different in other job markets.
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